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their capacity of dealing with different levels of uncertainty. In climate policy specifically,
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Introduction
Controlling anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions for the mitigation of climate
change remains one of the major environmental policy goals of present times.
Achieving this goal means managing various levels of uncertainty both in terms
of the policy problem, its repercussions and the policy responses that it warrants
based on a collaborative global effort. Governments around the world have taken a
variety of steps to contribute towards abating the ill effects from climate change, a
quintessential ‘wicked problem’ of environmental policy. Policy programmes for-
mulated for climate change mitigation need to address a variety of policy design
and policy capacity considerations in order to successfully meet their aims and
avoid failures while functioning under various degrees of uncertainty. While
policy failures may result from shortcomings during any of the stages of the pol-
icymaking process, failures in policy formulation and design specifically can result
from ‘attempting to deal with wicked problems without appropriately investigating
or researching problem causes or the probable effects of policy alternatives’
(Howlett, 2009). In addition to being susceptible to such process-oriented failures,
programme contexts requiring the enforcement, flexibility and coordination of
multiple government and market policy elements – such as those dealing with
climate change mitigation – can also be susceptible to ‘political’ failures
(McConnell, 2010a, 2010b). In such cases, the capacity of governance agents and
enterprising policy actors to navigate through sources of technical or political
hindrances, correctly diagnose the range of ambiguities and arrive at solutions is
paramount to how successfully matching policy objectives with policy means can
be achieved in various policymaking contexts. Especially, policy entrepreneurs may
find themselves in opportune positions to catalyse policy change and move the
policy design process forward. Little has been done to date to explicitly look at
the various capabilities and capacities of enterprising policy actors that can define
their function during policy formulation and beyond agenda setting in the policy
process until recently (e.g. Cairney and Jones, 2015; Jones et al., 2016).
Furthermore, the discussion of specific capacities of entrepreneurs during policy-
making and instrument design beyond agenda setting, remains emergent, and a
body of knowledge that this particular paper inspires to build on (Jones
et al., 2016).
There is agreement among policy scholars that with both technical as well as
political factors determining policy success, avoiding failure during policy formu-
lation requires analytical, operational and political competences on the part of
policymakers and enterprising policy agents. These skills are fundamental towards
deriving lessons from existing and past attempts at policy formation (Howlett and
Ramesh, 2015a; Little, 2012; Radaelli and Dunlop, 2013; Wilkinson, 2011), as well
as understanding governance capacities (Wellstead et al., 2011), in order to detect
and amend the root causes that undermine sound policy design (Howlett and
Ramesh, 2015b). That is, the essence of effective policy design lies in matching
broad policy goals (e.g. environmental conservation) with broad instrument
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logics (e.g. command-and-control regulation or market-based policy), matching
programme-level objectives (e.g. specific watershed protection targets) with types
of policy instruments (e.g. individual contracts or monetary compensation mech-
anisms) and matching specific instrument settings (e.g. calculation of environmen-
tal baselines) and on-the-ground calibrations (e.g. adjustments to compensation
levels) (Mukherjee and Howlett, 2016). Mismatches between such aims and
means, ‘often result when critical governance capacities are deficient, leading to
the compromised success of the entire instrument design process that follows’
(Mukherjee and Howlett, 2016: 35).
In addition, there is much discussion in policy studies on entrepreneurial behav-
iour on topics such as political agenda setting, policy change and reform (Mintrom
and Norman, 2009), dating back to the origins of the concept in John Kingdon’s
Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) (Kingdon, 1995). In the MSF, putting items
on the government agenda is attributed to the fortuitous ‘coupling’ of streams of
problem, policy and political events by policy entrepreneurs who make significant
resource investments, employ strategies such as bargaining and issue framing, and
seek access to decision makers surrounding a particular policy issue (Jones et al.,
2016). While giving rise to a growing body of empirical work that looks at the role
and specific position of policy entrepreneurs vis-a`-vis others agents in the policy
network.
Using the multi-level policy programme of the European Emission Trading
Scheme (EU ETS) – the largest of its kind in the world – as a critical example of
policy design, this paper focuses on distinguishing the different dimensions of entre-
preneurial capacity – analytical, operational and political – that can be decisive
during the formulation of a major policy instrument. We argue, that when analys-
ing the role of policy entrepreneurs beyond agenda setting and into policy formu-
lation, one of the necessary capacities of successful policy entrepreneurs has to do
with how they are able to help guard against uncertainties that are built into the
design process. These uncertainties can include a possible mismatch with existing
policies, existing institutions or the larger political context. In the area of climate
change policy specifically, there is also the inherent uncertainty surrounding the
effectiveness of certain instruments, their combination and their design to keep step
with changing climate problems and mitigation targets.
The European Commission officially introduced the EU-wide tradeable permit
scheme for carbon dioxide emissions in 2005 as one flexible instrument in the Kyoto
protocol and it represents the world’s first large-scale greenhouse gas trading pro-
gramme (Betz and Sato, 2006; Hoffmann et al., 2008; Saikku and Soimakallio, 2008).
Following a ‘cap and trade’ model of pollution abatement, the ETS is a market-
based instrument in which carbon permits are allocated to firms and can then be
traded among them (Bausch et al., 2016). The companies are in turn required to
report their emissions and to hand in the according allowances. The goal is to create
a market incentive to reduce emissions while at the same time imposing decreasing
pollution caps on power producers and industries (Krukowska, 2015).
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This example is used to highlight the uncertainties that can affect policy design
processes and how entrepreneurial capacities are able to address them. The policy
entrepreneur in this case is the European Commission (Braun, 2009; Egenhofer,
2007; Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2010). Especially in the climate change field, scho-
lars increasingly see institutions as the main origin of entrepreneurial activity rather
than individuals.
The paper proceeds by looking at current research on policy entrepreneurs in
relation to uncertainty and capacities. The ETS is used throughout the paper to
highlight aspects of the theoretical framework. Entrepreneurial capacities are then
discussed vis-a`-vis the stages of policy formulation and design, which are repre-
sented in the case as three phases linked to planning, designing and implementing
the scheme. The analysis matches capacities and design stage and uses these find-
ings to update the current theoretical framework. The final section concludes the
paper.
Uncertainty in policy programme design and the role of
policy entrepreneurs
Uncertainty is a characteristic trait of climate change mitigation programmes,
because the challenge is to reduce future emissions by setting targets based on
present scenarios and predictions. There is further the inherent vagueness of devis-
ing appropriate policy today to address possible policy scenarios of tomorrow and
to work on articulating effective programme design (Walker and Marchau, 2004).
Since the 1950s, with the discussion on proportional policy tools, questions have
been raised regarding the sequencing of policies over time (Taeihagh et al., 2013;
Tinbergen, 1952) and instating a preference for the use of the least intrusive instru-
ments initially, while designing programmes (Doern and Phidd, 1983; Doern and
Wilson, 1974). Building on these and other initial insights, principles of effective
programme design today have come to emphasize the context-driven, complexity-
espousing arrangement of policy elements into packages that match abstract policy
goals to policy instrument logics, operationalize programme-level objectives into
specific mechanisms and calibrate particular instrument settings (Howlett et al.,
2014; Howlett and Rayner, 2013). Following this line of research, scholars have
identified two sets of relationships: programme-policy and programme-implemen-
tation linkages (Table 1).
Programme–policy linkages connect programme design to existing governance
and historical circumstances. In operationalizing effective policy programmes, one
of the fundamental necessities is creating an optimum fit with the existing govern-
ance contexts as present arrangements and configurations of institutions (such as
the existence of federalism or a significant international treaty framework) influ-
ence specific types of governmental and social actor capabilities. In turn, these
capacity limitations and strengths inform the feasibility of potential programme-
level options and alternative arrangements of objectives and mechanisms.
In addition to governance scenarios, another defining feature of a design context
4 Public Policy and Administration 0(0)
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is the policy history informing the programme. In short, the combination of gov-
ernance context and programme design produces different types of uncertainties.
Not all possible policy elements may be available during programme formulation
because of the layering or tractability of past policy choices that delimit the pre-
sent selection of policy components for programmes (Thelen, 2003; Van der
Heijden, 2011).
In creating and optimizing this connection between programme objectives and
broad policy goals, those concerned with programme design need to account for
uncertainties embedded in the governance context within which the programme is
to operate. One of the mismatches that may occur is due to the uncertainty
surrounding whether the existing governance mode is suitable to accommodate
the proposed programme. In the context of tradeable permits to address emis-
sions reductions, for example, if the ambiguity is related to incorrect incentives,
then it is unlikely to succeed in a network or legalist mode of governance than
one which is more attuned with market mechanisms (Howlett and Ramesh,
2015a, 2015b; Weaver, 2014). This form of regulatory uncertainty (Engau and
Hoffman, 2009; Hoffman et al., 2008) can come about when individuals involved
in the formulation of policy packages perceive an uncertainty in the basic direc-
tion of the regulatory environment, where there is a defined target but lacking
confidence about ‘how to reach the target taking into account the political con-
sensus on the basis of objective and subjective arguments’ (Hoffman et al., 2008:
715). In addition, uncertainty about what the possible solutions or combinations
of policy elements are going forward, given the existing layers of policy efforts
and constraints, may also manifest during the translation of abstract policy goals
to coherent policy programmes. This form of interdependence uncertainty arises
out of haphazard layering of policy elements such as ‘when a new regulation is
added to an already regulated field or if it is implemented in conjunction with
other regulations’ (Hoffman et al., 2008: 715).
Programme-implementation linkages describe how programmes fare in practice.
Here, it is important to maximize complementarity between the various policy tools
working together within the programme by analysing their interactions with each
other as well as the existing, on-the-ground policy ‘duplicates’ that may either be
redundant or, in fact, strengthen the resilience of the programme (Grabosky, 1995;
Gunningham et al., 1998; Ostrom and Basurto, 2011). In the context of environ-
mental policy, many policy programmes of the 1990s included numerous combin-
ations of command-and-control regulation and voluntary instruments, and these
mixes resulted in internally conflicting policy components that hindered the success
of these programmes (Del Rio et al., 2011). This lack of complementarity is a result
of effect uncertainty whereby there is an inability to perceive the effect of new
policy component interactions in future policy scenarios (Milliken, 1987). Lastly,
programme settings that translate to balancing the effect of new policy compo-
nent interactions can be affected by response uncertainty or the perceived inability
to see the response or consequences of choices made in the design phase
(Milliken, 1987).
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Design uncertainties and the ETS case
When designing and deciding on the EU ETS several of these forms of uncertainty
can be observed. Historically, the ETS Directive was adopted by the European
Council of Member States in 2003 and took effect on 1 January 2005. The content
of the Directive was largely based on the ‘Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading within the European Union’ (European Commission, 2000).
Defining the scheme at EU level means that all EU Member States are connected
through the EU-wide cap with individual allocation plans that lay out the number
of allowances at national level and require overview by the European Commission.
The Directive also had a built-in review after the trial period from 2005 to 2007,
which led to revisions in 2008 responding to both Member State and industry
concerns. The initial period was a way to develop a price for the EU Allowance
Unit of 1 tonne of CO2 (short: EUAs) and built the infrastructure for monitoring,
reporting and verifying actual emissions within the EU. Following the initial
launch, the second phase, 2008–2013, incorporated the required reviews identified
in 2008, but was also heavily shaped by the economic crisis in Europe, which
resulted in reduced emissions from EU companies and thus in a large surplus of
EUAs. In its current phase, 2013–2020, the scheme has been streamlined to reduce
fraudulent activities and account for equal and fair access to auctions. In addition,
the auctioning of 900 million EUAs was postponed to the end of the trading period
that had been accumulated earlier in the process (Chandreyee and Velten, 2014).
There are several uncertainties connected to these developments, especially in
the initial phases of the ETS. First, this scheme was new to Europe and one of the
first of this size. There was a federal version of cap and trade in the US Sulfur
Dioxide Trading and some other similar programmes in the US and Europe at
federal and national level, but nothing comparable in size (Ellerman et al., 2016).
This means that there was uncertainty surrounding how such a system would fit
with existing schemes in Member States (regulatory uncertainty). It was also
unclear how Member States and industry would react to a new, European-level
scheme that would require adjustments in implementation and emission policy
(interdependence uncertainty). These responses affect the market, because fluctu-
ations on the allowance demand side, such as future GDP growth of EU Member
States influence the trading scheme (effect uncertainty). The perception of the
scheme also has consequences. Low prices reflect the expectations of traders
about future political decisions (Knopf and Edenhofer, 2014). Finally, to check
against regulatory uncertainty, the EC has to constantly not only monitor the
emission market, but also initiatives by Member States to put in place according
measures. To account for some of these uncertainties, the EC decided on the trial
period for the first two years in order to adjust the scheme in 2008 and define
phases beyond this point of revision. In subsequent stages, additional adjustments
were required and will be linked to entrepreneurial capacities of the European
Commission in the remaining part of the paper. The implementation stages are
largely shaped by response and effect uncertainty as new and more rigorous
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measures are introduced by the EC and market developments gain importance as
trading gets underway, whereas the planning and design of the ETS faces regula-
tory and interdependence uncertainty.
Entrepreneurial capacities and policy design
The capacity of those involved in policy design to overcome some of the challenges
posed by the various uncertainties is important, yet currently under-discussed in
policy studies. Meta-reviews of the multiple-streams framework that focus on how
the policy entrepreneurship concept has evolved since its inception, indicate that
entrepreneurial capacity remains a new research topic (Cairney and Jones, 2016;
Jones et al., 2016; Mintrom and Norman, 2009), and possibly one that can have
implications for how the MSF can be extended through the policy process, beyond
agenda setting (Be´land and Howlett, 2016).
The role of policy entrepreneurs in bringing about policy change beyond initial,
agenda-setting venues of the policy process is understood in the policy studies as
being ‘important but limited: they are well informed and well-connected insiders
who provide the knowledge and tenacity to help bring the ‘streams’ together – but
as ‘surfers waiting for the big wave’ rather than people who control policy pro-
cesses’ (Cairney, 2013, citing Kingdon, 1995). In this sense, the proof of policy
entrepreneurs’ success lies in how well they are able to identify and take advantage
of fleeting, fortuitous ‘windows of opportunity’ to bring about policy change.
Policy entrepreneurial capacity in context
The contexts within which policy entrepreneurs operate can have a profound bear-
ing on how strongly these individual actors can exercise influence over the policy-
making process. For example, policy entrepreneurs as individuals can become
singularly influential during the policy cycle not only due to their means and
resources but also due to their discursive skills and unique powers of persuasion
(Palmer, 2015). Policy processes have been recognized as being significantly shaped
by rhetoric and argument and these motivations and strategies echo Kingdon’s
(1995) ideas about entrepreneurs ‘softening up’ the political milieu and ‘framing’
the reality about pertinent policy issues into accessible knowledge in political
debates. However, policy entrepreneurial success in using the power of discourse
and ideas can vary significantly due to institutional contexts and governance styles.
As argued by Be´land (2016), in comparing governance contexts of France and the
United States, ‘in France, state bureaucrats and experts typically play a greater role
in the production of policy proposals than in the United States, where non-state
actors such as think tanks have more clout, in part because of the decentralized and
pluralist model of expertise stem’. For understanding policy processes in the EU,
the notion of policy entrepreneurs has helped inform research over a broad array of
sectors such as education policy (Corbett, 2005), agricultural policy (Ackrill and
8 Public Policy and Administration 0(0)
Kay, 2011; Ackrill et al., 2013), biofuel policy (Palmer, 2015) and most such empir-
ical findings indicate, and understandably, that while enterprising policy agents
may be able to impact the ‘problem’ and ‘policy’ streams through strategies such
as framing, they exhibit very limited and minimal control over contextual variables
that emerge in the politics stream.
Similarly, work on theorization about policy entrepreneurs and the policy con-
texts they inhabit has also pointed towards cases where contextual factors reduce
the chances of policy change and entrepreneurial action can be decisive in galva-
nizing transformations (Balla, 2001; Mintrom and Norman, 2009). Indeed, this
echoes the important dynamic between the contingency in policymaking contexts
and the possibility of policy change as ‘Kingdon’s framework emphasizes both
agency (the role of policy entrepreneurs) and timing (the elusive and short-lived
policy windows these entrepreneurs must take advantage of to move their issues to
the forefront)’ (Be´land, 2016: 230). And as mentioned above, without fortuitous
combinations of contextual elements of the politics stream, attempts by individual
actors to manipulate the opening or closing of a policy window are not likely to
succeed (Palmer, 2015).
Entrepreneurial ‘capacity’, we then argue, goes beyond what the existing lit-
erature on policy entrepreneurs has broadly discussed as a ‘skill’ or ‘resources’
that these actors invest into promoting their preferred policy elements.
Entrepreneurial capacity, in this article, involves balancing analytical, operational
and political competences in order to navigate politicized policy contexts, make
the best of institutional styles or prevailing governance regimes, while requires
‘the combination of social acuity, with skills of conflict management and nego-
tiation’ (Mintrom and Norman, 2009: 652). Entrepreneurs of the policy process
must have the acumen to push their favoured policy elements within political and
ideational landscapes that necessitate the consideration of both the ‘logic of
interpretation’ and the ‘logic of position’ of actors within the policy process
(Be´land, 2016; Parsons, 2007). Kingdon (1995) propounds that this requires
entrepreneurs to be well connected to relevant policy communities as well as
political contexts in order to be successful in bringing about policy change.
According to Mintrom and Norman (2009), this form of social acuity requires
distinct sets of abilities on the part of entrepreneurs for first, extracting relevant
and innovative knowledge from various policy networks, and second, keenly
understanding the ideas, motives and concerns circulating within the local
policy context.
The volatility of policy contexts such as climate change make it an area of policy
design research in which the challenges, both internally to governments’ own for-
mulation processes and externally to the state of the problem at hand, can reach
unprecedented (1995) magnitudes (Gleeson et al., 2011; Rotberg, 2014). These
insights echo those articulated by Mintrom and Norman (2009: 650) who state
that ‘when new challenges appear so significant that established systems of mana-
ging them are judged inadequate. A key part of policy entrepreneurship involves
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seizing such moments to promote major change. Such action requires creativity,
energy and political skill’.
But what are these skills? That is, what unique abilities or capacities on the part
of some individuals enable them to become policy entrepreneurs and catalyse
policy change? Governance competences to address these challenges embody
three particular sets of skills:
analytic ones which allow policy alternatives to be effectively generated and investi-
gated; managerial [operational] ones which allow state resources to be effectively
brought to bear on policy issues; and political ones which allow policymakers and
managers the room to manoeuvre and the support required to develop and implement
their ideas, programs and plans. (Howlett and Ramesh, 2015a: 322)
Further, these competences manifest at the level of individual policy actors,
government organizations as well as the larger political system that contains the
policymaking activity (Blind, 2006; Colebatch et al., 2011; Gleeson et al., 2011;
Howlett and Ramesh, 2015b; Tiernan and Wanna, 2006).
Looking beyond these general capabilities, an exploration of policy entrepre-
neurs in the context of climate policy design reveals that a specific skill of effective
policy entrepreneurs is the ability to build a network of support and assimilate a
coalition that advocates change (Rabe, 2004). Building on this, Mintrom and
Norman (2009) in their review of the state of knowledge on policy entrepreneurs
outline abilities related to ‘social acuity (networks and incorporating ideas into
local contexts), defining problems (framing crises, pointing out problems with
existing policies), building teams (coalitions) and leading by example’.
Wu et al.’s (2015) depiction of policy capacity captures this multidimensionality
of competences and forms the basis of this paper’s exploration of policy entrepre-
neurial capacity. The multi-levelled conceptualization provides a framework for
situating various levels of policy capacity and their interactions. Wu et al. (2015)
distinguish between three ‘families’ of competences relevant to policy capacity:
political, operational and analytical. They contend that these can exist at three
levels of policymaking capabilities: individual, organizational and systemic
(Table 2). This analytical framework therefore allows for a nested and inclusive
analysis of policy capacity, instead of limiting the discussion to any one compe-
tence or any one capability level and several authors on capacity have now used
this framework for its analytical appeal. For example, Dunlop (2015) discusses the
developing of learning relationships within governance partners as a part of organ-
izational political capacity (political competence at the organizational level of
policy).
In exploring entrepreneurial skills through the EU ETS example, we attempt to
define policy entrepreneurial capacity as being the combination of individual-level
policy competences (political, operational and analytical, as elaborated upon in the
first column of Table 2), with the additional competence for mitigating uncertainty
in the policy process. That is, we maintain that policy entrepreneurial capacity is a
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function of individual policy analytical aptitude, managerial expertise and political
acumen, combined with the entrepreneur’s capacity to guard against uncertainties
in the policy process. This combination, we argue, allows for the role of entrepre-
neurs to be understood and analysed beyond the agenda-setting stage and into
process of policy formulation and policy design.
Entrepreneurial skills and the EU ETS case
The EU ETS case presents an example of a multi-level governance context wherein
a market has been designed to function across several jurisdictions, and as a result
operates in tandem within a strong multi-layered regulatory framework. In creating
a market for tradeable permits, there has been a heavy reliance on contracts and
regulations while propagating incentive structures for reducing emissions, which
work within regulated allowances for pollution (Krukowska, 2015). The govern-
ance of the emission trading scheme thus requires a mix of technical knowledge as
well as analytical, managerial and political expertise to incorporate that knowledge
into policymaking processes. Technical knowledge paired with analytical skills is
Table 2. Policy capacity: capabilities and competences (Howlett and Ramesh, 2015a, b; Wu
et al., 2015).
Capabilities
competence Individual level Organizational level System level
Analytical Policy analytical apti-
tude
Knowledge of policy
substance and ana-
lytical techniques
and communication
skills
Organizational infor-
mation capacities
Information and e-ser-
vices architecture;
budgeting and
human resource
management
systems
Knowledge system
capacity
Institutions and oppor-
tunities for know-
ledge generation,
mobilization, and
use
Operational Managerial expertise
Leadership, strategic
management, nego-
tiation and conflict
resolution
Administrative
resource capacity
Funding; staffing; levels
of intra-agency and
inter-agency
coordination
Accountability and
responsibility
system capacity
Rule of law; transpar-
ent adjudicative
system
Political Political acumen
Understanding of the
needs and positions
of different stake-
holders; judgement
of political feasibility
Organizational political
capacity
Politicians’ support for
the agency; levels of
inter-organizational
trust and
communication
Political economic
system capacity
Public legitimacy and
trust; adequate
fiscal resources
Mukherjee and Giest 11
needed to deal with complex quantitative economic and financial issues involved in
regulating and steering the sector and preventing crises (Howlett and Ramesh,
2015b). Such analytical aptitude thereby involves acquiring substantive knowledge
of the issue area and the ability to effectively analyse and communicate technical
information. Managerial expertise is reflected in the capacity of individual policy
designers to successfully negotiate and resolve conflict.
Entrepreneurial leadership, in this context, reflects both political acumen as well
as managerial expertise, and can be defined as
a matter of finding means to achieve common ends. . .one actor’s guidance is accepted
by others either because they become convinced about the (substantive) merits of the
specific ‘diagnosis’ he offers or the ‘cure’ he prescribes, or because a more or less
diffuse faith in his ability to ‘find the way’. (Underdal, 1991: 145)
Dynamics that warrant high levels of political and managerial know-how are
situations defined by regulatory uncertainty and the early phases of policymaking,
when institutional processes are more fluid as suitable policy means are being sought
(Skjærseth andWettestad, 2010; Underdal, 1991; Young, 1991). In the context of the
ETS, several authors have characterized the actions by the European Commission as
entrepreneurial leadership (Braun, 2009; Egenhofer, 2007; Skjærseth andWettestad,
2010). During a time when the Member States were undecided on the type of meas-
ure to be adopted and a carbon tax proposal failed at European level, the European
Commission saw the opportunity for amore flexible mechanism and put forward the
proposal for a mandatory cap-and-trade system (Taschini et al., 2013). At an indi-
vidual level, the Directorate-General (DG) Environment Department of the
European Commission was in the process of significant personnel changes with
the appointment of several individuals who were in support of flexible mechanisms
and whose analytical capacities became instrumental for the initial proposal. An
example was Peter Zapfel, the assistant to the Deputy Director General of DG
Environment at the European Commission, who joined in January 1998 and had
studied emissions trading in the US context (Wettestad, 2005). In short, there was a
window of opportunity for change and the European Commission used it to induce
entrepreneurial leadership for the goal of an ET scheme.
Entrepreneurs and policy design: The ETS case
The introduction of ETS in the EU has several stages. First, a planning phase
where policy ideas were being developed, then a design phase for more concrete
measures. Following this, there are so far three implementation phases: 2003–2007,
which marked an initial testing stage for the scheme; 2008–2012, the first proper
implementation of ETS; and 2013–2020, the current phase in which measures have
been adjusted and new elements are being planned for the next phase from 2021
until 2028. During the design stage of the scheme, the European Commission
drafted a proposal to gain support from the European Council and European
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Parliament for the scheme. Political acumen and managerial expertise on the part
of entrepreneurs remained relevant at this stage that was defined by reconciling the
interests of various stakeholders. After alluding towards a trading scheme in the
late 1990s, for example in ‘Climate Change – Towards an EU post-Kyoto Strategy’
(EC, 1998), the Commission formally proposed the scheme in October of 2001. The
drafting of this proposal involved different steps. First, the European Commission
(2000) put forward a Green Paper on emission trading that included ideas on what
a possible European scheme could look like.
This stakeholder consultation document alluded to the attractiveness of finding a
solution in the middle ground between harmonizing or coordinating of some design
features and decentralized decision-making in the Member States on other features,
where diverting choices were not thought to cause frictions in the EU-wide market for
GHG permits. (Zapfel and Vainio, 2002: 11)
This was further supported by a multi-stakeholder working group in the
European Climate Change Program. The group agreed upon issues related to the
establishment of the scheme and brought forward a recommendation, which
showed a high degree of consensus despite the fact that the members were diverse
– ranging from industry players and Member States to environmental groups
(Zapfel and Vainio, 2002). The European Commission also relied on outside know-
ledge about emissions trading and possible designs to develop the proposal. For
example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development published
a report on the US experiences in sulphur dioxide emissions trading (Braun, 2009),
which was used by members of the EC.
The proposal brought forward in October of 2001 shows clear signs of com-
promise. For example, the opt-in and opt-out clauses were removed in the very
last phase before launching the draft. The directive also ‘leaves the setting of
reduction targets to the Member States, subject to verification of a national
allocation plan to be transmitted to the Commission’ (Christiansen and
Wettestad, 2003: 10). This limited trading scheme was an opportunity for the
European Commission (2001: 5) to reduce controversy surrounding the scheme
and to strike a balance between ‘simplicity, effectiveness, subsidiarity and trans-
parency’. Delaying some of the measures was also a way of reducing effect
uncertainty by implementing the measures stepwise and being able to better
trace the effects of certain components. To summarize, the following features
were included or changed to achieve approval for the scheme and avoid further
controversy (Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003):
. Mandatory scheme with unspecified caps: Reaching harmonization and redu-
cing market distortion while retaining flexibility;
. Gas and sectoral coverage: Reducing complexity by focusing on few sectors in
the beginning; high penalties for non-compliance: based on positive experience
in the US Sulphur trading system;
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. Project-based credits are not included: connected to feasibility and complexity
concerns in terms of reducing triggers for renewed political negotiations.
Taken together, the dynamics occurring in the planning and initial design stage
show that the European Commission focused on elements of feasibility and largely
avoided complex and controversial issues as much as possible. It also points
towards reduced response uncertainty, since the measures have proven to be effect-
ive in the past as the scheme continues the direction laid out in the Kyoto Protocol
in the 1990s with the goal of a universal market (Bernstein et al., 2010). The EC
further showed high levels of analytical competence, which were manifested in the
first proposal, but also in the way negotiations were held (stakeholder consultation
document, multi-stakeholder working group). Managerial and political skills were
further necessary to draw up feasible details of the scheme and pursue possible
conflict resolution to reach a compromise.
Since this initial proposal, three consecutive stages of implementation and rede-
sign have taken place signifying the ‘program-measure’ phase of policy design. The
first phase of ETS spans 2005–2007. In this pilot stage, the details of the initial
allocation decisions were widely left to Member States in combination with non-
compliance penalties in the form of fines. This stage also included the struggles that
the European Commission was confronted with during the adoption of the scheme
and the inherent response uncertainties surrounding its impact on the economy and
climate change.
Experience from this first trading period (2005–2007) showed that the decentralized
system and lack of verified emissions data contributed to the excessive allocation of
allowances and a sharp fall in the carbon price which reduced incentives for partici-
pating industries to invest in carbon ‘friendly’ technology’. (Skjærseth and Wettestad,
2010: 317)
In response to this, the European Commission (2013) was in constant commu-
nication with Member States and industry to – what it called – ‘learning by doing’.
In short, the goal of this stage was to get the scheme underway in a form that
elicited the most agreeable response by Member States and industry as well as
environmental stakeholders while planning to delay some stricter restrictions to
later development stages. In other words, balancing political feasibility and efficient
implementation were the primary goals. This strategy shows high levels of analyt-
ical aptitude in the sense that certain techniques were used to get stakeholders on
board while pushing for a stricter scheme later on. Also, framing this phase as
‘learning by doing’ reduces some of the pressure to perform at such an early point
in the adoption, allowing room for trial and error to best maximize complementa-
rities between policy elements and reduce response uncertainties.
In the second stage of implementation, which started in 2008 and ended in 2012,
the European Commission moved from a more agreeable allocation scheme, which
gave authority to the Member States, to auctioning taking effect in 2013 (Braun,
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2009). Paired with the now limited leeway of allocation, there was also increased
use of benchmarking and the European Commission reduced emission budgets
(Egenhofer, 2007). This led to the number of allowances being reduced by 6.5%
for the period, in addition to emission cuts linked to economic downturn (EC,
2013: 4). Ultimately, this phase ended with a surplus of unused allowances. This
negatively affected the carbon price and revealed effect uncertainty and sub-optimal
complementarity between different elements of the programme. These develop-
ments have led the European Commission to move away from more qualitative
guidelines towards rigorous quantitative processes (Betz and Sato, 2006). A final
change is the participation of Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein as of January
of 2008.
This phase highlights some real-world problems and uncertainties related to
both the external effects of the programme as well as internal components of the
policy. In addition, the economic crisis reduced emissions from companies and
resulted in a surplus of EUAs, causing a fall of the price from 30 Euro to less
than 7 Euro (Chandreyee and Velten, 2014). This led to the European Commission
running into credibility problems due to the change in carbon price and requiring
additional efforts as well as managerial and political abilities to understand the
positions of the stakeholders as the scheme develops while also finding a solution
that would appease all parties. The danger at this point in time was that the ETS
would lose its credibility and parts of the scheme would not be politically feasible
anymore connected to high levels of effect and response uncertainty. In reaction to
that, the European Commission significantly changed the scheme for the following
phase III.
The EU ETS is currently in the third development stage, which started in 2013
and runs until 2020. The main changes in this phase include the shift towards an
EU-wide cap on emissions (reduced by 1.74% each year) instead of national caps
and auctioning is now the default method for allocating allowances after a transi-
tion phase. There are also more sectors included and Croatia has joined the ETS in
January 2013 (EC, 2013). The latest assessment of the ET scheme reveals that –
according to the European Commission (2014: 3) – the EU is ‘on track to meet its
Kyoto target for the second commitment period with a potential overachievement
of 1.4 Gt CO2-eq’. Thereby, ‘13 Member States still need to implement additional
policies and measures to meet their 2020 national emission reduction target in the
sectors not covered by the EU ETS’ (EC, 2014: 4). Over time, the role of the
European Commission has shifted from being a ‘watchdog’ over Member State
Emission targets towards putting in place stricter allocation rules (Ellerman et al.,
2011). At the same time, some Member States have introduced own measures to
show their discontent with the ETS. For example, both the UK1 and Germany
have discussed initiatives at national level. The UK has introduced the carbon price
floor (CDF) in 2013, which taxes those fossil fuels that are used to generate
electricity (HM Revenue and Customs, 2017). ‘In the event that the price of
EUAs falls below a set threshold, entities covered by the EU ETS need to pay
the difference to the UK Treasury in the form of an additional tax on emissions’
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(Bausch et al., 2016: 9). Other hurdles the ETS is currently facing include a surplus
of allowances due to the economic crisis and warm weather.
This year, the emission permit prices are 70% lower than at the start of 2008
(beginning of the second trading phase). This has to do with the fact that last
year was Europe’s warmest on record and power prices fell in countries like
Germany, which is the largest European economy (Krukowska, 2015). The wea-
ther also reduced carbon emissions and therefore limited the demand for allow-
ances. To tackle the surplus of allowances, the European Commission decided, as
a short-term measure, to postpone the auctioning of 900 million allowances until
the end of the third trading period (2019–2020) and to tackle effect uncertainty in
the midst of unexpected developments surrounding the measures. As a long-term
solution, the EC plans to establish a market stability reserve (MSR). This would
imply that there is no discretion to the Commission or the Member States regard-
ing implementation, but entirely predefined rules would be set up (EC, 2015).
This proposal was approved by the European Parliament on 7 July 2015 and will
take effect in 2019.
The third trading phase marks a combination of radical changes based on the
problems that occurred in the second stage as well as reacting to challenges, such as
continued economic downturn and warmer weather. The European Commission
will have to push its managerial competences in order to be successful in conflict
resolution and negotiating short- and long-term changes with Member States. This
is especially important for any structural reforms, because neither the
Environmental Parliamentary Committee nor the Commission can proceed
unless a significant number of MEPs agree (The Economist, 2013). For the
recent MSR proposal, experts were consulted by the EC to understand projected
effects of the measure. A large proportion of the Member States further expressed
support for MSR and called for an early launch with the backloaded allowances
being moved into reserve rather than being auctioned off (EPRS, 2014). The overall
goal is to prevent destabilization of the market due to unallocated allowances, since
this issue has created tension between the European Commission and the Member
States (EPRS, 2014; Neslen, 2015). This decision pleases industry, because it makes
the market developments over the next few years more predictable and avoids
drastic price drops. Environmental stakeholders, however, criticize the fact that
the reforms do not tackle the underlying issues of the ETS’s effectiveness and might
lead to greater fluctuation in price down the line (Neslen, 2015).
For the next stage (2021–2028), changes have already been suggested to adjust to
current developments in the ET scheme. Some of the key changes include several
support mechanisms to help industry and the power sector to meet the goals of
lowering carbon emission levels linked to an Innovation Fund and a
Modernisation Fund. There is further the goal of updating benchmark values
and have more targeted carbon leakage groups to better allocate free allowances
(EC, 2017). These changes are paired with binding annual greenhouse gas emission
targets for Member States for those sectors not regulated under the ETS.
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The combination of regulatory measures and industry support is a way to balance
carbon emission goals and ensure competitiveness of EU industries:
The proposed rules aim at safeguarding the international competitiveness of the
EU energy intensive industries in the gradual transition to a low-carbon econ-
omy as long as no comparable efforts are undertaken in other major economics,
and maintain incentives for long-term investment in low-carbon technologies.
(EC, 2015: 2)
In short, the EU ETS is under constant revision as the market and Member
State initiatives are changing. This requires flexibility on EC side, since regulatory
changes can affect trading scheme prices, national-level measures as well as innov-
ation of industries that are energy-heavy. This calls for managerial and political
competences in order to determine when a change might be feasible and also vari-
ous analytical techniques to communicate and frame the changes in a way that is
accessible and acceptable to all stakeholders.
Discussion: Entrepreneurial capacity to address design
uncertainties
To mitigate some of the uncertainty surrounding the ETS scheme, there seem to be
two factors affecting the competences of the EC. First, the EC needs to commu-
nicate changes well and frame them in a way that reduces effect uncertainty for the
market. This can be done by adding to the knowledge about the effects of the
scheme and presenting them in a way that restores credibility to it. The second
aspect of this is dealing with uncertainty on the EC side – the gap in knowledge
about GDP, weather or market developments and at the same time looking at
possible regulatory and interdependence uncertainty in connection to reaching
the climate change targets in interplay with current regulations and policy pro-
grammes. This requires accurate judgement of current and future developments
(analytical aptitude and political acumen) as well as managing possible conflicts
occurring from these uncertainties (managerial expertise).
The various development stages of the ET scheme highlight a pattern of different
competences necessary to address the design, inherent uncertainties and implemen-
tation of the emissions trading. Table 3 maps these different levels of competences
throughout the planning, development and implementation stages.
The varying levels of analytical, managerial and political competences are linked
to steps that the EC took to determine changes to the ETS moving forward. In the
first phase, the scheme required high levels of analytical competences due to the
generation of policy ideas, the knowledge of the policy substance and the effective
communication of it (Howlett and Ramesh, 2015a, b). For ETS, this is reflected in
the expertise accumulated in DG and the stakeholder consultation conducted at the
time to gain knowledge while also advocating for the flexible scheme itself in multi-
stakeholder groups. The high levels of analytical competences and medium
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operational and political competences shift when moving into the design stage, as
the reality of setting up the scheme requires political support, public legitimacy and
the understanding of different positions as well as the administrative structures and
negotiation techniques to define the details (operational competences). This is spe-
cifically reflected in the scheme brought forward in 2001, which had signs of com-
promise and resulted in a limited trading scheme to reduce controversy.
For phase I, the distribution among the competences remains similar, because
putting measures into practice has political and organizational consequences.
Again, the European Commission put forward an agreeable allocation scheme
to appease Member States and industry stakeholders (political competences).
At the beginning of the implementation, organizational and political competences
go hand in hand since once emission trading was underway, the European
Commission needed to communicate, consult and coordinate the operation
in tandem with industry, Member States and environmental groups. This was
further supported by political competences, which include the development of
quick and accurate judgements about the desirability and feasibility of different
aspects of the scheme (Head, 2008; Howlett and Ramesh, 2015a, b; Tenbensel,
2008).
In phase II, the EC was confronted with the economic crisis and the conse-
quence of a surplus of EUAs. This implementation stage was also marked by
Member States setting their own emissions cap and deciding on the national frame-
work while the European Commission functioned as a ‘watchdog’ by assessing
national plans and rejecting them if they were not in line with prior agreements
(Bausch et al., 2016; Wettestad et al., 2012). This again required high levels of
operational and political competences, whereas the price fluctuations and EUA
surplus needed additional analytical capacity.
Table 3. Policy design phases and entrepreneurial competences in the ETS case
Analytical aptitude Managerial expertise Political acumen
Policy programme phase: Addressing regulatory and interdependence uncertainties
EU ETS planning stage High Medium to low Medium
EU ETS initial design
stage
Medium High High
Programme implementation phase: Addressing response and effect uncertainty
EU ETS implementation
phase I (2005–2007)
Low High High
EU ETS implementation
phase II (2008–2012)
Medium High High
EU ETS implementation
phase III (2013–2020)
High Medium to low Medium
EU ETS: EU Emission Trading Scheme.
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In the latest implementation phase III, the European Commission is facing
controversy linked to the backloading measure. After a rejection by the
European Parliament in 2013, an amended version was approved which will
allow a single backloading operation. In preparation for the next phase, the
European Commission extensively consulted experts as well as Environmental
and Labour Ministers of Member States to gain knowledge on consequences for
the market in junction with MSR and at the same time secure political support for
upcoming changes. The expert meeting on ETS took place in June 2014 focusing on
price formation, market functioning and the evolution of the surplus. There was
further an informal meeting of EU Environment Ministers and an informal joint
meeting of EU Environment and Labour Ministers in July of 2014 (EU, 2014).
Hence, due to introducing a new measure, the MSR, analytical competences need
to be high in order to anticipate some of the market developments connected to
MSR. This also requires a medium level of political support, because there is
backing for the overall ET scheme, but changes within the framework require
renewed support and thus political competences. The organizational competence
is lower compared to the previous year, as many of the administrative structures
have been established and the EC has come closer to establishing administrative
structures that can cope with changes in the market and in political support. More
generally speaking, managerial expertise and political acumen levels go hand in
hand throughout the evolution of ETS. Once the emission trading was underway,
the European Commission needed to communicate, consult and coordinate the
operation in tandem with industry, Member States and environmental groups.
This was further supported by political competences, which include the develop-
ment of quick and accurate judgements about the desirability and feasibility of
different aspects of the scheme (Head, 2008; Howlett and Ramesh, 2015a, b;
Tenbensel, 2008). This includes an understanding of political trade-offs and com-
promises that were struck throughout the phases. A major part of this are also the
changes made between phases, where consultations and review led to harmonizing
and tightening the rules of emission trading throughout the EU. Finally, in antici-
pation of the fifth trading phase, the European Commission again needs high levels
of analytical competences to process the information available up to this point and
then formulate changes that satisfy the different groups involved. These compe-
tences can also be linked to the uncertainties arising in the process: Whereas trade-
offs and compromises reduce effect and response uncertainty, harmonizing rules
throughout the EU can limit regulatory and interdependence uncertainty. In add-
ition, acknowledging different interests in formulating changes further tackles
response uncertainty.
Overall, different competences have been more or less critical at different points
in time. While the analytical competences are particularly important during the
development of new ideas, the managerial and political competences are required
for the management and implementation of policies. Part of the successful devel-
opment of the emissions trading scheme is the entrepreneurial leadership role that
the EC took on while manoeuvring the different competences.
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Concluding remarks
The application of the competence framework in the uncertain setting of the EU
ETS reveals that all competences need to be available, but are given different
weight throughout the design and implementation phases to address different
kinds of uncertainties. Whereas analytical competences seem to be particularly
important during the planning and replanning of the policy, managerial and
political competences go hand in hand while advocating for the scheme and
accommodating potentially adverse stakeholders. Thereby, it is important to
note that the EU ETS case poses a special example, because political power
and entrepreneurial traits are combined in the members of the European
Commission committee and the DG rather than the intervention of an outside
policy entrepreneur. This allows for better access to the design process itself and
effectively tapping into the different competences. However, lacking some of these
competences could have been critical for the scheme, as a lot of political skill and
tactfulness were required to get it started while analytical competences were the
basis for developing a solid design.
As expected, there were inherent uncertainties to the emissions trading, such as
warm weather or the economic crisis. However, the case also highlighted another
dimension to the dynamics of uncertainty. The Commission’s actions are part of
diminishing some of the market uncertainties. In other words, the way the EC
adapts to the insecurities of the markets affects overall uncertainty connected to
the scheme. This means the entrepreneur and decision-maker of the policy can have
influence on some of the uncertainties surrounding implementation whereas in the
design stage, there is more focus on the adaption to existing uncertainties.
Finally, this paper only poses a first step in applying the framework to a variety
of cases. The question remains if the pattern established for the different capacity
levels throughout design, implementation and redesign hold up for other policies in
the climate change realm and whether the entrepreneur as a separate actor in the
process can take on some of the competences to complement the work being done
within government. For now, we can conclude that entrepreneurial activity made
the EU ETS development possible, while the analytical, managerial and political
competences enabled design, implementation and redesign of the scheme. Thereby,
adaptation to occurring uncertainties gave the EC credibility in dealing with this
market tool while delaying potential controversies to a later stage in which some of
the challenges might have diminished. The pattern emerging from this case is that
high levels of analytical competences are required for the design and redesign of the
policy, while managerial and political competences go hand in hand during the
implementation phases.
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Notes
1. In a 2016 referendum, the UK decided to leave the European Union and the process was
started in March 2017. The exact conditions are currently being negotiated and the effects
on the ETS are pending.
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